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ABSTRACT The smart electricity grids have been evolving to a more complex cyber-physical
ecosystem of infrastructures with integrated communication networks, new carbon-free sources of power
generation, advanced monitoring and control systems, and a myriad of emerging modern physical hardware
technologies. With the unprecedented complexity and heterogeneity in dynamic smart grid networks comes
additional vulnerability to emerging threats such as cyber attacks. Rapid development and deployment of
advanced network monitoring and communication systems on one hand, and the growing interdependence
of the electric power grids to a multitude of lifeline critical infrastructures on the other, calls for holistic
defense strategies to safeguard the power grids against cyber adversaries. In order to improve the resilience
of the power grid against adversarial attacks and cyber intrusions, advancements should be sought on
detection techniques, protection plans, and mitigation practices in all electricity generation, transmission,
and distribution sectors. This survey discusses such major directions and recent advancements from a lens
of different detection techniques, equipment protection plans, and mitigation strategies to enhance the
energy delivery infrastructure resilience and operational endurance against cyber attacks. This undertaking
is essential since even modest improvements in resilience of the power grid against cyber threats could lead
to sizeable monetary savings and an enriched overall social welfare.
INDEX TERMS Cyber physical systems (CPS), cyber attack, intrusion detection system (IDS), false data
injection attack (FDIA), energy management system (EMS), power grid resilience.
I. INTRODUCTION
SMART GRIDS have transformed the monitoring,control, and operation of bulk power grids via modern
communication, signal processing and control technologies.
While the smart grids allow for power networks to
be effortlessly and wide-area monitored, the widespread
deployment of modern information and communication
technologies (ICTs) engenders a significant security concern
and vulnerability to malicious cyber attacks: adversaries
which may alter the underlying physical systems and
processes, thereby potentially compromising the national
security [1–3]. With the extensive integration of cyber
infrastructure in smart grids is formed an expanded
attack surface characterized by intensified complexity,
heterogeneity and number of resources [4] (see Figure
1). This is evidenced by the frequency, complexity, and
severity of cyber attacks targeting several key power system
operational functions such as automatic generation control
(AGC), state estimation (SE), and energy management
systems (EMS) which have been globally observed to
be on the rise in recent years [5]. Cyber attacks are
malicious intrusions triggered by disrupting the cyber layers
of the communication systems in the power grid. There are
generally four types of attacks that the power grid may
be vulnerable to: physical-only, cyber-only, cyber-enabled
physical and physical-enabled cyber attacks [6]. Disruptions
appear when either the system operator makes a detrimental
error based on compromised sensor measurements or the
power grid is remotely or directly controlled by a malicious
intruder [7]. An intruder may be motivated to initiate a
cyber attack for many reasons including financial benefits,
large blackouts, or a combination of both [8]. The gravity
of the attack is dependent on the resources the attacker
has access to and the knowledge he/she possesses on the
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Figure 1: General view of the power grid cyber vulnerabilities.
system topology. The more accurate model the attacker
has access to, the larger the deception attack that can be
executed undetected [9]. Attackers may take advantage of
their knowledge of the grid and launch coordinated attacks
to critical substations in the network which may eventually
cause brownouts/blackouts with significant techno-economic
consequences [10]. From a realization perspective, a cyber
attack can be considered measure-based or control-based.
A measure-based cyber attack targets the tie-line flows and
frequency measurements, i.e., the measurements PL45, PL69
and the system frequency being sent to the control center.
A control-based cyber attack targets the area control error
(ACE) values once they are sent from the AGC algorithm
and before they arrive the designated substations. An attack
can send the opposite-direction ramping commands to the
generating units. Modifications to the ACE signals (e.g., a
sign change of the ACE value) can lead to the generation
ramping-up for load reduction and vice-versa [11].
Historically, there were reported incidents in which power
systems and industrial control systems (ICS) had their
systems cyber compromised. In the United States, the power
grid was penetrated in 2009 by cyber spies and a key
infrastructure was compromised by an undetected intrusion:
Siemens supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA)
systems were attacked by computer worm Stuxnet. In 2010,
Stuxnet was able to infiltrate Iran’s Natanz nuclear fuel-
enrichment facility which was a part of Iran’s nuclear
development project [12, 13]. In 2003, a cyber-attack
penetrated a computer network at the Davis-Besse nuclear
power plant located in the US [13]. There have also been
reports that an experimental cyber attack was launched by
researchers which caused a generator malfunction and self-
destruct [14]. Energy theft is another common cyber attack
practice in which the electric power is misused or "stolen"
by a malicious intruder. Reports reveal that the United
States loses ∼ $6 billion due to energy theft alone while it
accounts for ∼ $25 billion loss by the electric companies
globally [15]. Even advanced metering infrastructure (AMI)
platforms, which are used to moderate the power flows in
the grid, have been compromised and abused for energy
theft. In 2009, the FBI reported a wide and organized energy
theft scheme which may cost a utility company up to $400
million annually following the deployment of AMIs [16, 17].
One major known attack was the cyber attack that occurred
on the Ukrainian power grid, happened on December 23rd,
2015, where a third party from Russian security services
illegally entered the SCADA systems and computers, and
ultimately caused a blackout with massive consequences: a
service outage that left 225,000 customers without electricity
for 2-6 hours [18]. Such blackouts are detrimental in that
they cause financial losses and disruptions in all aspects of
our everyday life [19]. Hence, characterization, modeling,
and assessment of the power grid cyber vulnerability and
designing solutions to protect the grid and enhance its
resilience against cyber adversaries is essential. This is
because even modest improvements in resilience of the power
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Figure 2: General architecture of a CPS with multiple layers.
grid against cyber threats (through advanced monitoring,
efficient threat detection, and recovery algorithms) could lead
to sizeable monetary savings and an enriched overall social
welfare. More critically, it could help reduce undesirable
social, psychological, and physical outcomes associated with
the prolonged power outages resulting from cyber intrusions,
e.g., premature death, injury, social unrest, etc.
Various studies have investigated the impact of cyber
attacks against different day-to-day operation and control
mechanisms in power grids, including but not limited to
state estimation (SE), electricity markets, power system
protection, renewable forecasts, and power system dynamics
and control [1, 2, 20–31], among many others. A cyber-
resilient power grid entails fault tolerance, fast response,
recovery and reliability. Ensured resilience of the power
grids against extremes does not only reduce the volume of
outages, but also ensures that the grid timely responds to
a variety of cyber catastrophes and man-made faults [32].
In the case of power transmission systems, difficulty in
maintaining system security arises in that intelligence is
only applied and available locally by protection systems
and by central control through SCADA systems. In some
cases, the central control system is slow to respond to cyber
attacks and the protection systems are limited to a few local
components [33]. There are many methods to model a cyber
attack: an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) trajectory plot
can model the different paths it can take based on the type
of the cyber attack and the impact the attack imposes on the
power grid [34]. Attack trees can be devised to model many
types of cyber attack scenarios encompassing all possible
approaches an attacker may take [15, 35] or other methods
such as Markov decision process (MDP) to enumerate all
possible attack scenarios [36]. In order to model a control
system, however, a graph-based topological network model
or graph theory is proposed for a target control system.
Integrated with logical connection information, it permits the
implementation of a simple Prolog-based expert system to
represent a device visibility path and allows assessment of the
device vulnerability [37]. A classical mathematical model to
describe the power transmission grid is commonly referred to
as the structure-preserving power network model. It consists
of dynamic swing equations for generator rotor dynamics
and algebraic load-flow equations for power flow through
network buses [22].
Aiming at reporting the existing state of knowledge on the
topic, this paper is structured as follows: a background on
cyber attacks including definitions, potential attack surfaces,
and the impacts on bulk power grids are presented in
Section II. Section III discusses the power grid resilience to
cyber attacks and how the smart grid cyber layer should be
characterized to resist cyber threats, ensuring the operational
endurance and resilience. Section IV reviews some protection
mechanisms in power systems against cyber adversaries to
prevent failures, followed by Section V where mitigation
solutions are reviewed. The paper will be concluded in
Section VI with several concluding remarks.
II. CYBER ATTACKS: MODELING AND CLASSIFICATION
In this section, the root causes of cyber attacks and the attack
surfaces are firstly reviewed to overview where in power grid
such threats would emerge. The impacts of cyber attacks on
power systems are next discussed, considering the technical
failures and the consequent effects of triggering events.
A. CYBER ATTACK ROOT CAUSES AND SURFACES
The smart grid is a hybrid of power and communication
systems, the latter of which renders vulnerabilities which can
be compromised during a cyber attack; these vulnerabilities
are confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA) [38]. In
today’s standards, the power grid is characterized as a cyber-
physical system (CPS) shown in Figure 2, which contains
physical, sensor/actuator, network, control, and information
layers. Manipulation of each layer is possible but does
not necessarily mean an intrusion detection component or
system needs to be applied in all layers. Information flows
in between all layers as they operate only in tandem [39].
Cyber attacks appear in many different forms, where
its most basic definition is man-made manipulation of
the power grid and redirecting power flow to where it
is unassigned by the network operator (see Table 1). As
different interoperability layers of smart grids including
physical, function, and business layers are interconnected
through communication layer to exchange information,
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Table 1: Potential Attack Surfaces in Power Grids
Transmission
System
Distribution
System Device System Attack Type
Data Concentrator (DC) X X X FDIA/Delay/Jamming
SCADA X X X FDIA/DOS
Control System X X X FDIA/DOS
State Estimator X X FDIA
Communication Channel X X X DOS/Jamming/Delay
Power Market X X FDIA/DOS/Delay
Remote Termial Unit (RTU) X X X FDIA/DOS/Delay/Jamming
Phasor Measurement Unit(PMU) X X X FDIA/Delay/Jamming
Programmable logic controller (PLC) X X X FDIA/Delay/Jamming
Advanced Meter Infrastructure (AMI) X X FDIA/Jamming
Intelligent Electronic Device (IED) X X FDIA/Jamming
attack surfaces are wider than those listed in Table 1.
However, in this table, the most common surfaces which have
potential to be attacked in existing modern power systems are
reviewed as a basis to identify the domain and the type of
common attacks.
Some of the main common attacks are denial of service
(DoS), false data injection attack (FDIA), energy theft [17],
insertion of malware or worms, as well as physical damage
of the power grid such as causing equipment to self destruct
[14, 35, 40].
• DoS attacks are often realized when the attacker
jams the communication channels, compromises the
electronic devices, and attacks the routing protocols
which ultimately lead to delays and congestion in
the communication channels. Generally, a DoS attack
restricts a legitimate user’s access to the services and
resources by flooding the communication network with
unnecessary traffic [12, 41].
• FDIA scenarios are realized when an attacker injects
false data, usually on a communication line between the
field sensors and the control center, with the intent to
deceive the network operator and even disturb the SE
processes [8, 13]. FDIAs may result in a wide variety of
outcomes depending on the intruder’s intention, some of
which include energy theft, miscalculation of locational
marginal prices (LMP) for illegal market profits, and
physical damage upon the network. FDIAs can affect
the LMPs by misleading the SE which then adversely
affects the contingency analysis procedures [42].
• Insertion of malware or worms can range in
different types from malicious software which runs in
backgrounds to slow down the operations of the electric
utility computers to insertion of Trojan software to steal
practical security certificates [40].
Cyber intrusion does not necessarily have to occur in
the power system itself since it can originate from separate
systems that interact frequently with the grid such as electric
vehicle supply equipment (EVSE) [43]. In [40], a malware
attack model is able to attack the electric vehicle (EV)
infrastructure and its communication systems when EVs are
plugged in for charging. In some instances, attacks can be
undetectable such as malicious data injection attacks that
alter the values of measurements without being detected,
which may result in serious consequences [44].
From an engineering perspective, there is an opportunity
for cyber attacks in smart power grids due to the proliferation
and reliance on distributed advanced metering infrastructure
(AMI) [45], intelligent electronic devices (IEDs) [46–56],
and wireless and/or off-the-shelf communications components
and systems across the power network. Such cyber
infrastructure increases the system connectivity and
autonomous decision-making by employing standardized
information protocols that often have (or will have in the
future) publicly documented vulnerabilities. Motivations
for cyber attacks also abound. Market deregulation and
privatization of the energy industry has increased the
competition among energy providers to enhance consumer-
centricity. Threats also exist in the form of dissatisfied utility
insiders, electricity consumers, and cyber terrorists.
B. IMPACTS OF CYBER ATTACKS ON POWER GRID
Control systems are becoming more vulnerable as they
get overwhelmingly coupled with modern information and
communication technologies and the physical controllers
in a CPS [57]. The critical equipment and systems which
can be mainly affected or exploited during an attack are
in the energy management systems (EMS) in transmission
networks or distribution management systems (DMS) in
distribution networks. Such platforms collect data from
remote and distributed meters and sensors across the network
and generate estimates of the system states at the intervals of
roughly 15 minutes [46–51, 53, 55]. When false meter data is
injected through a cyber attack, the EMS or DMS functions at
the control center will be misled by the state estimators which
may potentially make erroneous decisions on contingency
analysis, power dispatch, and even billing actions [14].
The smart grid offers synchrophasor-based cyber security,
which entails a CPS system that provides real-time data
to the EMS in order to manage (monitor and control) the
physical network [58–61]. However, the latest synchrophasor
devices, e.g., phasor measurement units (PMUs), as well as
digital fault records (DFRs) and protective relays with PMU
functionality are susceptible to a wide range of errors [53,
60] including cyber attacks; this is even further challenging
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considering the fact that such equipment are intertwined
with a large number of legacy devices that have little or
no protection against cyber attacks [62]. In [34], the CPS
security is analyzed where a deception attack compromises
sensors, actuators and both sensors and actuators. The
probability of FDIA to be launched successfully usually
depends on two assumptions: (i) the attacker has control
over some sensor nodes and (ii) the attacker has complete
knowledge of the system or its exact topology at all moments
during the attack [63]. Generally, the highest impact of
an attack is realized when an intruder gains access to the
supervisory control access points of SCADA systems and
launches control actions [64]. The attacker may compromise
raw data measurements which causes undetected errors to
factor into estimates of state variables such as bus voltage
angles and magnitudes. This can occur when the attacker
takes advantage of small errors tolerated by SE algorithms.
Ultimately, this severely threatens power system security
[13]. Disturbances in SE can lead to increases in state
estimates mean square errors (MSE) and changes in the real-
time electricity market prices. The effect of invalid MSE
can lead to network operators making wrong decisions and
the changes in real-time electricity market prices can benefit
only the attacker. [65]. With FDIAs, the power grid can
suffer economic attacks, load redistribution attack, or energy
deceiving attack. An economic attack is a type of FDIA
which can affect operations of the deregulated electricity
market which is comprised of two markets: the day-ahead
market and the real-time market. An attacker can manipulate
market prices for power and get monetary gains. A load
redistribution attack is an attack which can affect power grid
operation by attacking the security-constrained economic
dispatch (SCED). The purpose of SCED is to minimize
the total system operation cost; however, when the raw
measurements are manipulated by an attacker, the SCED will
result in an overload of the lines that will remain unnoticed
by the system operator and ultimately causes large physical
damages to the power grid. An energy deceiving attack
affects the distributed energy routing process; essentially
this is a scheme to determine the optimal energy routes for
load demand or generation. When measured data has been
tampered, it can cause erroneous energy demand or supply
messages to initiate [13]. Overall, cyber attacks can impact
four main aspects of the bulk power systems which are SE,
AGC, voltage control, and energy market. FDIAs deceive
the system operators to believe that the current operating
conditions are secure both physically and economically when
they actually are not [42], injection of false data can affect
the stability and security of the system [66]. Spatiotemporal
cyber-state correlations can be used to detect the FDIA.
Potential anomalies can be detected by monitoring the
temporal consistencies of the spatial correlations between
state estimations [67].
Another way an intruder can affect the communication
network is by attempting to connect and dial up to a
remote terminal unit (RTU) or an IED which can allow
them to wiretap telecommunications, perform a local-area
network (LAN) or wide-area network (WAN) transmission
shown in Figure 3. They could also attack the corporate
information technology (IT) systems and gain backdoor
access to the interconnected EMS or SCADA systems;
internet service providers (ISP) and telecommunications are
other sources they can attack. Some electric utility providers
are dependent on corporate IT systems and this is how
their interconnected SCADA systems greatly intensify the
vulnerability of the electric power grid [37]. Similarly,
AMI systems can be attacked. AMI includes smart meters,
customer gateways, AMI communication network and head-
end; AMI is considered a fundamental technology of smart
grids for making two-way communications along with
various other functions. However, there have been several
potential vulnerabilities with AMI specifically the insertion
of malicious software and disabling of metering systems [38].
Cyber attacks and intrusions can occur multiple times
from a single origin and spread to different areas. A typical
example is electric vehicle charge stations (EVCS) [43,
68–72]: when a consumer charges its EV at multiple stations,
it is likely that malware can spread due to vehicle-to-
infrastructure and EVSE communications. Essentially, an
attack on an EV may spread to the power grid infrastructure
starting from the EVSE and all the way up to the
utility systems [40]. The integration of transportation and
power systems may leave many open doors for hackers,
especially in the interconnected environment, i.e., the EV
infrastructure, including EVs, EVSE, meters and other
roadside infrastructures and when deeply integrated with
critical infrastructure systems [73–75].
III. POWER GRID RESILIENCE TO CYBER ATTACKS
The concept of resilience has become a well-researched
topic in recent years as it mainly drives the swift detection
and effective mitigation of the power grid against high-
impact low-probability (HILP) events [76–78]. The word
“resilience” is originated from the Latin word “resilire”,
reflecting “the ability to rebound” [32]. Power system
resilience in the face of the devastating natural-driven HILP
events has been studied widely in the literature [76–97]. The
past research defines, quantifies, and categorizes the concept
of resilience in many different ways. For instance, the
National Infrastructure Advisory Council (NIAC) proposed a
universal definition of infrastructure resilience in 2010: “the
ability to reduce the magnitude and/or duration of disruptive
events. The effectiveness of a resilient infrastructure depends
on its ability to anticipate, absorb, adapt to and/or rapidly
recover from a potentially disruptive event” [98]. In a
similar attempt, [99] defines resilience as the system’s
ability to withstand the main interruption within acceptable
degradation parameters and to recover within an acceptable
time and composite risks and costs. An alternative definition
of resilience is the ability to prepare for and adapt to changing
conditions, featured with robustness and fast recovery [100].
The last but not the least interpretation of resilience could be
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Figure 3: System view of advance metering infrastructures.
Figure 4: Power system transition states following a critical
HILP disturbance: a proactive response and recovery strategy
that can be implemented in an automated manner can
minimize or bypass the preparation time when the event hits
the power grid, thereby effectively boosting its resilience.
the system’s ability to prepare and plan for, absorb, recover
from, and more successfully adapt to adverse events [101].
The power grid is required to supply the electric power
continuously and reliably to end-users in general and critical
lifeline infrastructures (e.g., water networks, oil and gas
systems, communication systems, transportation networks,
etc.) and mission-critical services (e.g., health sector, defense
bases, etc.). The electric sector’s approach to the protection
of the grid critical infrastructure is generally known as
“defense-in-depth”, which contains prevention, preparation,
response, and recovery for an inclusive range of credible
hazards to electric grid operations. Resilience in power grids
entails accurate threat detection, infrastructure vulnerability
monitoring, and timely response and recovery (see Figure 4).
Both “long-term” and “short-term” strategies for enhancing
the grid resilience against extreme conditions have been
addressed in the literature. In the former, enhancing the grid
structural resilience is primarily the focus of concern and
suggestions are toward deployment of the “grid hardening”
plans through reinforcement, preventive maintenance of the
critical assets, vegetation management, efficient allocation
of flexible energy resources (e.g., storage units), etc. In
the latter, improving the operational resilience is targeted
through fast emergency response and remedial actions,
defensive islanding, use of the micro-grids, etc.
The IT employed in industrial control systems (ICS)
is cyber-vulnerable in general and can potentially impose
direct impacts on the physical power grids. CPS will be
the core component of many critical infrastructures, yet
vulnerable to random failures and cyber attacks. Hence, it
is critical to design, develop, and implement ICS and CPS
with resilient cyber defense systems [12], i.e., integrating
robust intrusion detection systems (IDS) to ensure the power
grid resilience with countermeasures being taken effectively
[39]. Energy theft is an important concern relating to smart
grid implementation; while the implementation of AMI
is used to mitigate energy theft, penetration tests have
uncovered several vulnerabilities with smart meters [15, 17].
Deregulation of the electric power industry has unbounded
generation and transmission systems which, in turn, allows
for a broad range of participants to make decisions in the
power sector. This is critical as an attack on the SCADA
systems can disrupt and damage critical infrastructural
operations, contaminate the ecological environment, cause
major economic losses and, and even more dangerously,
claim human lives [102]. In presence of all these challenges
and vulnerabilities and the intensified number of access
points and functionalities to tamper with [103] in highly-
complex cyber-physical power grids, new strategies are
needed to secure the entire network against malicious cyber
intrusions [3, 97, 104–106].
The potential for achieving power system resilience
depends highly on how preventive and corrective
maintenance strategies are planned and implemented
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component-wise [107–112] and system-wide [113–127] as
well as where and how the security measures and systems
are deployed. Incorporating data and cyber infrastructure
to the power grid exposes the system to many cyber
security threats. The smart grids of the future with
massive renewable resources and an expanded uncertainty
set [128–130] will inherit not only the vulnerabilities of
advanced communication systems but also the vulnerabilities
of the legacy power system. Security mechanisms should
be designed into the power grid with the goal of reducing
vulnerabilities and mitigating their consequences [131].
Anomaly detection and root-cause analysis are essential for
building resilient CPS since the grid may not know how to
counteract the damage if it does not know what caused the
damage. Accurately detecting anomalies and isolating their
causes is important for applying appropriate proactive and
preventive measures [57], [41], [66].
IV. CYBER ATTACK PROTECTION
Most methods for detecting cyber intrusions rely on outdated
techniques that are originated from the IT domain and
adopted in smart grids in an insufficient manner. Typically,
the inherited techniques from power experts mainly focus
on existing types of attacks, e.g., load redistribution [132],
distributed DoS [133], etc. Real-time cyber vulnerability
assessment in power systems brings new challenges due to
the fact that the conventional techniques for cyber intrusion
detection in dynamic power systems are computationally
demanding to be applied in real-time.
Fundamentally, there are two types of attack detection and
identification strategies widely researched in the literature:
static and dynamic. Dynamic detection and identification
outperform its static counterpart while possibly using
fewer measurements. With a comprehensive assessment of
the limitations in both static and dynamic detection and
identification techniques, [22] proposes a provably-valid
dynamic detection and identification procedure borrowing
tools from the geometric control theory domains: the tools
are comprised of geometrically designed residual filters.
Cyber attack detection can be performed using relevant
and high-fidelity data. Spotting slight anomalies in PMU
data helps identify unobservable cyber attacks which can
not be detected by existing technologies. In [134], a
convex optimization-based decomposition approach utilizes
the low-ranking property of PMU data to formulate an
unobservable cyber attack identification problem as a matrix
decomposition problem where the observed data matrix is the
sum of the low-ranking PMU data and a linear projection of
a column-spare matrix. The majority of the existing attack
detection methods use measurements at one-time instance
and only explore the spatial correlations whereas the convex-
optimization decomposition method in [134] exploits the
temporal correlations as well and can identify unobservable
cyber-data attacks even when the system is dealing with the
aftermath of disturbances.
Strategies to detect cyber intrusions are plentiful and
endless since there is an expanded set of cyber attack
surfaces and vectors to be able to manipulate the grid
towards an intruder’s favor. In [19], a new network-
based cyber intrusion detection system (NIDS) uses multi-
cast messages in substation automation systems (SASs) to
monitor anomalies and malicious activities of multi-cast
messages which are based on IEC 61850, generic object-
oriented substation event (GOOSE) and sample value (SV).
NIDS detects discrepancies and intrusions which violate
the predefined security rules by using a specification-based
algorithm. To detect energy theft, another common challenge
in power systems, [17] uses normal and malicious data of
consumer consumption patterns and a consumption pattern-
based energy theft detector (CPBETD). This tool combined
with the application of a Support Vector Machine (SVM)
anomaly detector allows the algorithm to use silhouette plots
to identify different distributions in the dataset and relies on
distribution transformer meters to detect nontechnical loss
(NTL) at the transformer level. In order to detect cyber
intrusions in the system, it is essential to classify it for
identification. Effective techniques to classify cyber attacks
or anomalies are using SVMs and a variety of machine
learning algorithms.
Detecting intrusions through the entire sector of the power
network is challenging; in [135], a proposal of grouping
network buses and designing filters for detection and
isolation of faults addresses a feasible detection mechanism.
In addition to grouping network buses, [135] suggests using
the swing equation to model the power network which can
be used in tandem with grouping power buses. Investigating
system models and security requirements of AMIs to present
an attack tree based threat model for AMI has shown an
improvement in the detection accuracy and detection speed
of intrusions in [15].
While cyber attacks may become prominent in the future,
there are normal fault contingencies which occur in the
system on a daily basis driven by environmental stressors
and equipment failures. The system needs to be able to
differentiate the difference between an intrusion attack and
a natural discrepancy. In [136], a devised algorithm is
implemented to accurately detect and locate faults in power
systems in addition to identifying bad data using weighted
least absolute value (WLAV). WLAV has the ability to reject
bad data to reduce dimensionality. A Bayesian framework
can also be utilized to unify different approaches of network
detection based on random diffusions and algorithms which
are based on network’s spectral properties [137]. This
algorithm detects threat networks using partial observations
which can be optimal in the Neyman-Pearson sense and
prepares the system for cyber intrusion attacks should they
are launched in the future. A data-driven algorithm for online
power grid topology change identification with PMUs is
suggested in [58], where the proposed machine learning
algorithm can differentiate the various types of faults in
power grids and the topology switching actions initiated by
the system operators or attackers.
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Figure 5: FDI attacks on state estimation in a power grids.
A. FDIA DETECTION
The FDIA problem is viewed as a matrix separation problem
and two methods which are presently employed to solve
this problem are nuclear norm minimization and low rank
matrix factorization. These methods can recover lost or
missing data in addition to detecting malicious attacks in
the power grid. FDIA happens when an attacker injects false
data, usually on a communication line between sensors and
the control center with the intent to deceive the network
operator and even disturb the SE processes [8, 13]. Reference
[138] presents an approach using observer nodes to detect
and isolate cyber attacks on network nodes and those on
the communication links between the nodes. In order to
minimize the computational complexity, observer nodes
are reduced, while the observability of the system is not
compromised. A perturbation-based approach is employed
in [44] for detecting both fault-induced and maliciously-
injected bad data in the power grid. This method probes the
system by applying known perturbations and measuring the
values elsewhere to find unexpected responses in terms of
measurement values. [139] presents a mechanism for false
data detection which notices the intrinsic low dimensionality
of temporal measurements in power grids as well as the
sparse nature of the FDIAs. Several research efforts discussed
methods of building and detecting such an attack. Successful
implementation of FDIAs commonly requires full knowledge
of the network topology. [140] proposed a form of an
attack without having complete information of the network
topology. This can be done by using the kernel-independent
component analysis to map the restricted data into a new
Jacobian matrix, through which the undetectable attack is
modeled [140]. [141] proposed an extreme learning machine
(ELM) technique based on one-class-one-network (OCON)
framework to detect any cyber threat on the AC state
estimation. FDIA attacks are detected using Kullback-Leibler
Distance in [142], where the accuracy of the detection
mechanism is influenced by the predefined thresholds. A
novel false data detection technique based on the separation
of nominal power grid states and anomalies is discussed in
[139]. [143] used an algorithm to ensure shorter decision
time and a more promising FDIA detection accuracy by
tracking the unfamiliar parameters and process multiple
measurements at the same time.
Even though these techniques can prevent the system
from FDIAs to some extent, smart intruders may be still
able to damage the PMU (or RTU) measurements in power
grids and bypass the bad data detection (BDD) mechanisms
in SCADA systems and wide-area measurement system
(WAMS) platforms [14, 144–154] (see Figure 5). This
can be accomplished through manipulated measurements
and injecting artificially generated data to the basic
measurements in power grids [155–158]. An FDIA detection
mechanism in smart meters is modeled in [159]. Correlation
between the power system components and detection
methods against smart grid intrusions is proposed in [160].
An efficient approach to protect the power system from
FDIA is by implementing precautions in advance [161–164].
Robust SE algorithms against FDIA based on Markov chain
theory and Euclidean distance metric are introduced in
[165]. [26] modeled the FDIAs with multiple adversaries
against one defender implemented in the smart grid. A game
theoretic approach is used in [30] to study the interactions
between the defender and the attacker in CPS. DoS attacks,
random attacks, and FDIA intrusions are detected in [166]
using Kalman filter by estimating the variables of the
state processes and feeding them to either the χ2 detector
or euclidean detector. In order to detect the injected bad
data by PMUs, [167] introduced a distributed host-based
collaborative detection method using a conjunctive rule based
majority voting algorithm to detect such an attack.
B. PHASOR MEASUREMENT UNIT PROTECTION
In order for protocols and measurements to be true, exact,
and valid at all times with robustness against any external
changes, they need to be protected in smart grids. Protecting
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a set of basic key measurements and having PMU based
protection mechanisms or secure PMU equipment [7, 13, 58,
134] can retain the fidelity of the measured data and accurate
state estimates in a wide variety of smart grid applications
using such measurements. When a set of measurements is
protected, an attacker can not inject unobservable attacks
without hacking into the protected units [134] and allowing
themselves to be noticed. A distributed intrusion detection
system can be deployed for smart grids to pinpoint cyber
intrusions. This system contains an analyzing module (AM)
and an intelligent module which communicates between
three different cyber layers of home area network (HAN),
the neighborhood area network (NAN) and the wide-area
network (WAN) [38, 168].
It is estimated that in order to achieve a full power
system observability, one typically needs to install PMUs
at around one-third of the network buses; nevertheless,
it is recognized that this is difficult and costly to
achieve in the near future [169]. Therefore, one will have
to estimate the state of the system with a hybrid of
both PMUs and conventional measurements. This practice
essentially leads to careful selections of PMU placement
strategies in the power grid in order to minimize the SE
errors. [169] optimizes PMU placement to increase the
SE accuracy using an algorithm that is related to key
property and submodularity which contributes to efficient
greedy algorithms. An optimal PMU placement problem
is interpreted as an optimal experiment design problem
with a class of optimality criteria. In particular, the greedy
PMU placement algorithm achieves at least 63 % of the
optimal total variance reduction for typical power systems.
Performing a vulnerability assessment is critical to ensure
that power infrastructure cyber security is systematically
evaluated. This proposed framework provides a measure
to quantify system vulnerability and a planning tool to
assist system analysts to identify bottlenecks in the system
where improvements are most effective [64]. Similarly,
a novel vulnerability measure is introduced in [170] to
compare and prioritize different grid topologies against
FDIAs with incomplete information of the grid’s topology.
This measure can potentially help build power grids that are
less vulnerable against practical FDIAs when the attacker
has limited information and launches an imperfect attack.
In [3], discussions on how optimal placement of PMUs
throughout the power network may lead to very accurate
SE are provided. PMUs also provides advanced mechanisms
in detecting stealthy attacks. Rerouting the topology of the
power grid intensifies the complexity of the grid topology
and is used as a defense mechanism against FDIAs which are
undetectable via conventional means [63]. References [63,
171–178] suggest that leveraging defensive circuit breakers
and simultaneously applying grid re-configuration practices
can enhance the overall network efficiency, reliability, and
security. This is achieved at minimum cost and by harnessing
the network built-in flexibility only. Nevertheless, additions
of circuit breakers may not be a viable security measure
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Figure 6: Simulation results in a IEEE 30-Bus system from
[58], where (a) Transmission Line 2-4 is switched-off at t =
30ms only, (b) Transmission Line 2-5 is switched-off at t =
30ms only. Both features are extracted at Bus 6.
if the attacker has compromised a large set of sensor
nodes and knows a large portion of the grid topology.
In [58], advanced wavelet transform and machine learning
analytics are embedded in existing PMUs, devices with PMU
functionalities, or as a stand-alone sensor in power grids that
can detect the malicious changes in network topology by an
attacker (unwanted line switching operations). The waveform
features corresponding to different topology changes are
extracted as shown in Figure 6 which were used to detect and
classify the associated line switching actions characterized
through commutation jamming and/or FDIA scenarios.
Implementing different techniques to reduce the number
of simulations and achieve a quicker SE allows for early
event detection. This provides an opportunity for the network
operators to be prepared for the potential adversarial cyber
attacks since there will be additional time saved for the
optimal response to be deployed (see Figure 7). Using a
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) based dimensionality
reduction of PMU data allows for raw data blocks to
be processed quicker, thereby realizing an early detection
of cyber disruptions [179, 180]. Similarly, [134] uses
an unobservable cyber attack identification as a matrix
decomposition problem which contains a sum of low-ranked
matrices with a linear projection of a column-sparse matrix.
Since low-dimensional structure of PMU data matrix is
recently observed, the matrix decomposition problem has
attracted more attention and has wide spread applications
such as internet monitoring, medical imaging and image
processing [134]. In [181], a similar technique is proposed
which reduces the simulation run-time by incorporating
Importance Sampling which is used to speed up simulations
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Figure 7: Early event detection mechanisms in power grids.
several orders of magnitudes compared to the standard
simulation practices. This essentially increases the efficiency
of simulations associated with Markovian models on highly
dependable dynamic systems.
C. DETECTION USING MACHINE LEARNING
Machine learning and artificial intelligence techniques are
more recently proposed and applied in power systems to
identify disturbances and detect cyber attacks even through
deception [62]. Recent advancement in deep learning (DL),
a subcategory of machine learning that uses artificial neural
networks to extract accurate features from raw data, brings
about new solutions for data-driven attack detectors. In fact,
DL approaches use feature learning techniques to extract
novel features (aka signatures) in an unsupervised, self-
guided manner. Given a set of measurement data, with raw
features as the input, DL tries to crate and refine a set of
algorithms to reproduce the same data set as the output. The
generated algorithms try to minimize the difference between
the input and the output so that the original data can be
recovered directly from the generated features [97].
A machine-learned framework is created in [182]
and refined with unsupervised feature learning to detect
different types of cyber attacks in power systems. Stacked
autoencoder-based unsupervised feature learning is proposed
to capture useful and rich patterns hidden in the data
to recognize the cyber attack, and achieve competitive
results compared with detectors relying on detailed system
information and human expertise. In [41], research was
done to combine SVM with a variety of machine learning
algorithms to find the most promising algorithm which
can detect an adversarial intrusion. A robust spam filtering
method is introduced in [183] using a hybrid method for
rule-based processing and back-propagation neural network.
In [184], different types of deep learning mechanisms, e.g.
ANN, decision trees, etc., are tested to assess the cyber
security of a particular IEEE test system. Reference [185]
introduced a new model for malicious code detection using a
new hybrid DL model. A decision support tool is proposed
in [62] which enables power system operators to classify
various types of attacks. In this paper, different types of
classification algorithms are considered, e.g., OneR in which
the optimal feature and rule is extracted based on the
simplistic method [186], NNge which is a nearest-neighbor-
like algorithm that classifies samples by comparing them
to those which already have been observed and comparing
the new examples to their surrounding data points [187],
Random Forests which is an ensemble of tree predictors
where each tree casts a vote for the most popular class on the
input of a new instance [188]. In [189], an extended version
of deep belief network (DBN) called conditional DBN
(CDBN) was proposed to analyze the sequential PMU data in
real-time and detect the existence of information corruption
using auto-regressive (AR) data modeling scheme. In [190],
the efficiency of the DL-based cyber-physical approach for
FDIA detection is demonstrated. The proposed approach
addresses both cyber (e.g., information corruption) and
physical disruptions. Reference [191] used a scenario-
based sparse cyber-attack model with incomplete network
information to detect the possibility of data manipulation.
In this paper, the results demonstrated that the proposed
approach not only requires less assumption on system
topologies and attack types, but also verifies the high
detection accuracy of the adopted DL. Reference [192]
compared the performance of three different DL approaches:
(i) gradient boosting machines (GBM), (ii) generalized
linear modelings (GLM), and (iii) distributed random
forests (DRF). The numerical results justified that DL-based
approaches can accurately detect FDIA scenarios against
SE algorithms. Reference [8] proposed two DL techniques
for FDIA detection in smart grids. The first model uses
the multivariate Gaussian semi-supervised learning while the
second model uses a measurement-based deviation analysis
algorithm. Both models are used to identify anomalies in
transmission networks. In [193], a new detection framework
was proposed to develop a density ratio estimation (DRE)
technique: an efficient countermeasure against cyber-attacks.
Reference [194] proposes a DL-based model for FDIA
detection in smart meter data utilizing a state vector estimator
(SVE) and a DL-based identification (DLBI) algorithm. The
model uses the historical data and tries to recognize a pattern
to identify FDIA scenarios in real-time.
V. IMPACT MITIGATION AND RESTORATION
In industrial applications, strengthening industrial control
systems (ICS) will protect different classes of infrastructure
such as utilities and oil and gas facilities. The ICS is
strengthened by designing an intrusion detection system
contained in the cyber layer with a controller at the
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Figure 8: System architecture which supports EVSEs.
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Figure 9: Precision results of various classifiers [62].
physical layer dynamic system [12]. Having a resilient smart
grid entails both accurate and swift attack detection and
timely response and recovery. This goal can be achieved
by having distributed control agents that facilitate both
attack detection and system recovery through iterative
local processing and message transmission. These control
agents are distributed across the grid, thereby characterizing
distributed intelligence mechanisms [46, 58, 59, 104, 105,
195]. Limitations by a lack of information about cyber
attacks can be partially removed by future research and
development of the advanced testbeds for comprehensive
testing and evaluations. Test beds are extremely useful tools
for thorough evaluation of mitigation and economic strategies
in response to cyber vulnerabilities [46, 53, 64].
Modeling vulnerabilities in power grids are critical for
its survival under adversarial attacks. In order to create a
network topology model of vulnerabilities, device visibility
and device vulnerability need to be defined and quantified.
The concept of device visibility path, with the use of
a small Prolong application to assess the vulnerability
level of a hypothetical target device, can help map the
cyber vulnerabilities within a system, thereby enabling
opportunities to fortify the network security where needed
[37]. A model-based IDS for home area networks (HAN)
is suggested in [131] by identifying the security challenges
in HAN first and determining next how a Bayesian network
intrusion detection system can be used in future HANs.
In order to determine the IDS requirements for HAN,
examination of the existing types of IDS is needed; there are
signature IDS, anomaly-based IDS, and specification-based
IDS, as in the following:
• Signature-based IDS usually has a database of
predetermined attack patterns, known as signatures, and
detects the intrusions by comparing the system behavior
with these signatures.
• Anomaly-based IDS detects malicious activities with
regards to deviations from statistically normal behavior
in the system.
• Specification-based IDS also recognizes intrusions with
regards to deviations from normal behaviors of the
system. However, instead of statistical measurements,
normal behaviors are characterized based on manually
extracted specifications of the system.
Characterization of irreducible attacks or observable
attacks with the compromise of two power injection meters
is performed in [7] with the use of an efficiently designed
algorithm to group all observable attacks. In addition,
the deployment of secure PMUs is approached as a
countermeasure against unobservable attacks. When cyber
attacks occur, parts of the system will be compromised
and it is important to isolate them quickly while ensuring
a sufficient supply of power (through available equipment)
to the system load points and mission-critical systems
and services [40, 85, 88]. Reference [40] claims that
EVs mobility contributes to attack propagation. Therefore,
when an attack spreads via EVs, a mixed-integer linear
programming (MILP) optimization problem is suggested that
minimizes the risk of attack propagation while considering
the EV loads, EV threat levels and demand profile in power
distribution system (see Figure 8). In such a CPS ecosystem
of EVs, isolating the compromised systems will mitigate the
effect of a malware or worm while continuing to supply the
services to the customers.
In order to mitigate the detrimental consequences of an
adversarial cyber attack, one first step is to identify the
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attack itself. Classifying the attack and giving it an identity
allows operators to understand what they are dealing with. In
[62], different machine learning classifying algorithms were
tested in order to determine the viability of using machine
learning as a decision support for system operators; the
results demonstrated in Figure 9 show that it is a viable
approach but more research is needed for deployment in an
operational environment and practical settings.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper offers a detailed and comprehensive description
of the links between the adversarial cyber attacks and
power grid resilience, off-the-shelf cyber intrusion detection
techniques, and what systems are or could be in place to
protect the smart power grids against malicious cyber attacks.
The mechanisms through which cyber attacks can impact the
bulk power grid are reviewed to understand where and how to
enhance and reinforce countermeasures to mitigate the attack
consequences. Although there is a variety of cyber detection
and protection methods already in place, this review
highlighted the importance of considering cyber attacks in
planning for resilience in power grids: strategies that entail
both grid hardening practices for structural resilience as well
as procedures for operational resilience; this is due to the
recently more-frequent realization of emerging threats with
no or very few similarities to those formerly-experienced
incidents. While there might be found additional methods
for detection, protection and mitigation against cyber attacks
than those listed in this review and there will certainly
be new schemes and measures in the future, this survey
aimed to collect the state-of-the-art already-investigated or
implemented solutions to provide a basis for future research
and developments. Implementation of these various methods
on testbeds and real-world environments will finally allow
for improvements in monitoring, protection, mitigation, and
resilience of the smart power grids against the looming
threats of cyber adversaries.
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